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SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: RISKS,
RETURNS, AND RACE
Dorothy A. Brownt, Karen C. Burkett, Grayson M.P. McCouchttt
INTRODUCTION
Social security is the largest single federal social program. It covers
almost all American workers, and provides benefits for retired or dis-
abled workers as well as their dependents and survivors.1 Today, most
retired workers depend on social security benefits as their principal
source of income.2 One of the program's most important achievements
has been a dramatic reduction in the poverty rate among elderly Ameri-
cans. 3 Social security has special importance for blacks and other minor-
ity groups who are over-represented among low-wage workers. Social
security benefits not only make up a larger share of income for elderly
black households than for white households, 4 but also help to mitigate
persistent and pronounced racial disparities in household resources.
5
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1 In 1996, an estimated 96 percent of all workers in the United States were covered
under social security, and most of the remaining 4 percent were state or local government
employees who were covered by a public retirement system. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMIrrrE ON WAYS AND MEANS 6-10 (Comm.
Print 1998) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. At the inception of social security in 1935, only work-
ers in commerce and industry-then around 60 percent of the workforce-were covered. See
id. at 6. For a discussion of the racially skewed impact of the early occupational exemptions
(e.g., agricultural and domestic workers) and earnings thresholds, see MELVIN L. OLIwER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEw PERSPECrIVE ON RACIAL INE-
QUALITY 38 (1995) (noting that, in 1935, 42 percent of black workers in covered occupations
did not earn enough to qualify for benefits, compared to 22 percent of white workers in cov-
ered occupations).
2 See U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF Tm POPULATION 55 OR OLDER, 1996 93
tbl.VI.A.1 (1998) [hereinafter INCOME OF Tm POPULATION 55 OR OLDER] (in 1996, 61 percent
of all units age 65 or older had social security as more than 50 percent of income).
3 Nevertheless, among elderly social security recipients, the poverty rate for blacks re-
mains more than twice as high as the average rate. See id. at 133 tbl.VII.5 (in 1996, social
security reduced the poverty rate from 52 percent to 11 percent among all recipients age 65 or
older, and from 62 percent to 26 percent among black recipients age 65 or older).
4 See id. at 111 tbl.VI.B.4 (in 1996, social security represented more than 50 percent of
household income for 75 percent of black social security recipientsage 65 or older, compared
to 65 percent of white social security recipients age 65 or older).
5 See infra notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text.
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Although social security enjoys widespread popular support, the vi-
ability of the existing system is increasingly being called into question.
As baby boomers begin to retire, the ratio of current workers to retired
workers will decline sharply, triggering a corresponding decrease in the
ratio of annual revenue collections to annual benefit payments. Accord-
ing to recent projections, the system will be able to pay only around 71
percent of promised benefits after 2034.6 While some changes in the
existing system appear inevitable, the nature and direction of future re-
form remain highly controversial. S6me reformers seek to preserve so-
cial security more or less in its present form with modest adjustments,
while others propose to move toward a privatized system.7 Proponents
of privatization argue that replacing all or part of the existing defined-
benefit system with a defined-contribution system of private accounts
would leave all workers better off in the long-run.8
The debate over social security reform has far-reaching implications
for the economic well-being of blacks and other minority groups. In this
article, we examine how blacks have fared under the existing system, and
then consider the likely consequences of moving toward a privatized sys-
tem. 9 Specifically, we consider the claim, recently advanced by some
privatizers, that blacks receive an especially "bad deal" under the ex-
isting system and would be better off linder a privatized system. 10 We
find that, for blacks as a group, this claim tends to overstate both the
6 At present, social security generates annual surpluses which are accumulated in the
social security trust funds and invested in government bonds. According to recent projections,
annual benefit payments will exceed annual payroll tax revenues beginning in 2014, and the
trust funds will be exhausted in 2034. Thereafter, annual tax revenues will be sufficient to pay
only around 71 percent of annual expenditures. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. OLD-
AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND DIsAIiTrrY INS. TRUST FUNDS, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 3-4
(1999).
7 In general, privatization implies that payroll taxes would be used to fund private ac-
counts for individual workers. Furthermore, individual workers would control the investment
of funds in their own accounts. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
9 A richer discussion would examine the implications of privatization for other minority
groups as well as blacks. A major difficulty in assessing the impact of social security on
different racial or ethnic groups stems from the nature of the available data. Data are fre-
quently broken down by racial or ethnic categories, but those categories tend to shift over time.
Thus, for example, a simplistic distinction between "white" and "nonwhite" fails to differenti-
ate blacks from other minority groups such as Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. See
Dean R. Leimer, Historical Redistribution Under the Social Security Disability Insurance Pro-
gram, 61 Soc. SEcURrY BULL. 3, 4 (1998); James E. Duggan et al., Returns Paid to Early
Social Security Cohorts, 11 CoNTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 1, 5 (1993); Social Security and Minori-
ties: Current Benefits and Implications of Reform, Testimony before Subcomm. on Social Se-
curity of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong., 1 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter Social
Security and Minorities] (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni).
10 See WiLLIAM W. BEACH & GARETH G. DAVIS, SOCIAL SEcURrrY's RATE OF RETURN
15 (1998) ("the Social Security system is a bad deal"); cf. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at
39 ("the social security program today is a system in which blacks pay more to receive less").
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shortcomings of the existing system and the advantages of privatization.
Furthermore, we urge that the racial impact of social security reform de-
serves serious and sustained consideration. While the path of reform will
inevitably require difficult tradeoffs between competing policy goals and
political constituencies, no serious reform proposal can ignore the issue
of racial equity in the debate over social security. 1
I. SOCIAL SECURITY-A "BAD DEAL" FOR BLACKS?
A. SocIL SEcuRIT AND ITS CRmIcs
The existing "pay-as-you-go" system finances social security bene-
fits primarily through flat-rate payroll taxes imposed on the earnings of
current workers up to a specified earnings cap.12 The primary benefit
payable to a retired or disabled worker is determined according to a pro-
gressive formula, based on the worker's average covered earnings prior
to retirement or disability. 13 Due to the progressive benefit formula, the
percentage of the worker's earnings represented by the primary benefit
(known as the "replacement rate") varies inversely with the level of cov-
ered earnings. Thus, while high earners receive higher benefits in abso-
lute terms, low earners receive a higher percentage of their prior
earnings. In addition to the primary benefit, social security provides aux-
iliary benefits for the retired or disabled worker's spouse and dependents,
as well as survivor benefits following the worker's death.
The progressive tilt in the benefit formula is designed to provide an
adequate level of income for low earners, who are least likely to have
accumulated private savings during their working years. Similarly, the
auxiliary and survivor benefits are intended to provide support for depen-
11 See Social Security: Restoring Long-Term Solvency Will Require Difficult Choices,
Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 7 (1998) (statement of
Jane L. Ross) ("In addition to examining the effects of reform proposals on all retirees gener-
ally, attention should be paid to how they affect specific subpopulations, especially those that
are most vulnerable to poverty, including women, widows, minorities, and the very old.");
House Comm. on Ways and Means, Report of the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security,
96th Cong. 137 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 Advisory Council Report] ("one of the important
factors to be considered in making any changes in the social security program is the effect the
change will have on racial and ethnic minorities"); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A
Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. Rv. 751, 802-03 (noting impor-
tance and difficulty of accommodating both public policy goals and racial equity).
12 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (payroll taxes imposed at 12.4 percent rate, split
equally between employers and employees); 42 U.S.C. § 430 (earnings cap). For 1998, the
earnings cap was $68,400. See U.S. Soc. SEc. ADMiN., ANmuAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO
ThM SOCIAL SECURITY BuLLm'N 37 tbl.2.A3 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT].
13 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 415, 423(a). For workers becoming eligible in 1998, the
basic monthly old-age benefit was equal to 90 percent of the first $477 of average indexed
monthly earnings (A]ME), plus 32 percent of the next $2,398 of AIME, plus 15 percent of
AIME over $2,875. See 1998 STATISTICAL SuPPLEMENT, supra note 12, at 48 tbl.2.All.
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dent family members. These redistributive features are grounded in con-
siderations of "social adequacy," which aims to provide adequate
protection for all workers against loss of earnings due to retirement or
disability. 14 At the same time, the redistributive features of the existing
system are in tension with the goal of "individual equity" which suggests
that individual workers should receive an actuarially fair return in the
form of benefits relative to their contributions.
Social security strikes a delicate balance between these competing
goals of social adequacy and individual equity. Social adequacy implies
the need for some redistribution, but individual equity views redistribu-
tion of any sort as a windfall to some groups at the expense of others.
Undoubtedly, the structure of social security as a program of defined
benefits with pay-as-you-go financing has facilitated massive net trans-
fers of wealth within and across generations. By contrast, moving to-
ward a defined-contribution system with private accounts for individual
workers would represent a decisive shift in the direction of individual
equity. Indeed, the standard argument in favor of privatizing social se-
curity asserts that the existing system represents a "bad deal" for current
and future workers and that a privatized system would provide higher
returns while promoting national saving and economic growth in the long
run. 15
Proposals for privatizing social security are usually directed at
young workers with high-expected earnings, who stand to reap the most
obvious and substantial benefits from a system of private accounts. Nev-
ertheless, some privatizers have attempted to enlist support among blacks
and other nontraditional constituencies by focusing on relative rates of
return under the existing system. Specifically, a report recently issued by
the Heritage Foundation claims that "Social Security offers a worse deal
14 Although social security covers almost all American workers, see supra note 1, cover-
age extends only to those regularly employed in the workforce. It would be possible, of
course, to design a comprehensive system of universal benefits based solely on need, without
regard to contributions, but such a system would represent a fundamental departure from the
existing model of social security. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women,
Fairness, and Social Security, 82 IowA L. REv. 1209, 1218-19 (1997); cf. Mary E. Becker,
Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein &
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLtrM. L. REv. 264, 279-83 (1989) (questioning wage-
based structure of social security); OLIVER & SHAPmo, supra note 1, at 38-39 (noting impact
of coverage and benefit structure on blacks).
15 See BEACH & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 15 ("many ordinary Americans already under-
stand that the Social Security system is a bad deal"); id. at 16 ("For almost every type of
worker and family, retirement under Social Security means receiving fewer dollars in old age
and passing on less wealth to the next generation than they could if allowed to place their
current Social Security tax dollars in private retirement accounts."); see also Steven Caldwell
et al., Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans, in 13 TAX POLICY AND THE ECON.
orvn 109, 110 (James M. Poterba ed., 1999) (describing rates of return for postwar cohorts as
"quite low"); I REPORT OF Tm 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SECURITY 102-08
(1997) [hereinafter 1994-1996 ADVISORY CoUNCIL REPORT] (statement by Joan T. Bok et al.).
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[for a black worker] than it does for a white worker with an identical
income and family structure." 16 This claim, if substantiated, amounts to
a charge of racially discriminatory impact in the existing system, and
deserves careful scrutiny.
B. INCOME, RACE, AND MORTALITY
At first glance, the Heritage Foundation's claim may seem some-
what surprising, since black workers as a group have disproportionately
low earnings compared to the general population 17 and therefore might
be expected to enjoy a net advantage from the existing system with its
progressive benefit formula. However, it is generally recognized that the
progressivity of the benefit formula is blunted by a countervailing mor-
tality effect. Low earners have shorter life expectancies than the general
population, and receive correspondingly lower returns in the form of old-
age and survivor benefits. 18 Furthermore, since blacks have shorter life
expectancies than whites, even after mortality rates are adjusted for in-
come, some studies conclude that blacks receive a slightly lower rate of
return than whites in the form of old-age and survivor benefits.' 9
16 WILLIAM W. BEACH & GARETH G. DAVIS, SOCIAL SEcuRITY's RATE OF RETURN: A
REPLY TO OUR CRrrIcs 8 (1998); see also BEACH & DAvIs, supra note 10, at 8 (comparing
rates of return); Caldwell et al., supra note 15, at 133 (claiming that nonwhites experience
higher lifetime net tax rates than whites due to shorter life expectancy).
17 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 436
tbl.696 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (in 1997, full-time black workers
had median weekly earnings of $400, compared to $519 for full-time white workers).
18 See Julia Lynn Coronado et al., Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to the
Social Security System, in 13 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 149, 170 (James M. Poterba ed.,
1999) (finding that income-differentiated mortality reduces progressivity of old-age and survi-
vor benefits by more than 50 percent); Daniel M. Garrett, The Effects of Differential Mortality
Rates on the Progressivity of Social Security, 33 J. ECON. INQUIRY 457, 457 (1995) (suggesting
that the mortality effect of being poor may be strong enough to offset the progressivity of old-
age benefits); C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 119 (1994) (concluding that
mortality rates and other characteristics related to income level weaken the progressivity of
social security but "the impact is not very large"); cf. Social Security and Minorities, supra
note 9, at 3 (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni) ("The consensus among researchers is generally
that the progressivity of the benefit formula outweighs the negative effect of lower life expec-
tancy for blacks in terms of what they contribute."); HENRY J. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
SOCIAL SECURITY 80 (1982) ("On balance, it is clear that such factors as differential mortality
and age of entry offset, but do not eliminate, the progressivity of the social security benefit
formula, that survivors and disability insurance reinforce it, and that social security has pro-
vided relatively larger lifetime wealth increments to cohorts with low earnings and, within
those cohorts, to workers with low earnings.").
19 See CONSTANTLUN W.A. PANIs & LEE A. LLLARD, SOCIOECONOMIC DIPFERENTIALs IN
THE RETURNS TO SOCIAL SECURITY 20 (RAND Labor and Population Program Working Paper
Series 96-05, 1996) (concluding that "whites experience higher returns than blacks at a given
income level and marital status," due to differential mortality rates); see id. at 14 (estimating
difference as around half a percentage point); Caldwell et al., supra note 15, at 112-13 (finding
that due to shorter life expectancies, nonwhites face "slightly higher (about a third of a per-
20001
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Calculating accurate rates of return on social security contributions
is no easy task. Most empirical studies derive flows of contributions and
benefits from simulated work histories based on stylized profiles of hy-
pothetical workers differentiated by a limited number of specified char-
acteristics (e.g., race, sex, marital status, and earnings level).20 Even
when performed with the utmost care, this simulation approach inevita-
bly misses other relevant variables (e.g., work history, earnings patterns,
divorce, remarriage, and mortality) that may significantly affect rates of
return.21 These problems could be avoided by using real-world data
based on actual work histories, but such data are largely unavailable or
incomplete. The most comprehensive data set based on actual work his-
tories is the "continuous work history sample" maintained by the Social
Security Administration, 22 but because this sample tracks individuals
rather than households, studies relying on it must use simulated work
histories of unobserved household members.
23
Although the Heritage Foundation report complains of the Social
Security Administration's "stunning silence" about rates of return for mi-
nority groups, 24 the report itself illustrates the need for care in interpret-
ing available data and calculating rates of return. Specifically, the
centage point)" lifetime net tax rates than whites). But see Dean R. Leimer, Lifetime Redistri-
bution Under the Social Security Program: A Literature Synopsis, 62 Soc. SECURrIy BULL.
43, 45 (1999) ("On average, whites appear to have received lower rates of return than non-
whites, due in part to the historically lower earnings of nonwhites coupled with the progressiv-
ity of the benefit formula; these factors appear to outweigh the generally lower survival
probabilities for nonwhites."); id. at 47 n.15 (noting that "[c]onclusions regarding differential
treatment by race under the OASI program have been less consistent across studies than con-
clusions regarding differential treatment across earnings, gender, and marital status groups").
20 See, e.g., SrEtuaLa & BAKIJA, supra note 18, at 99-102 (specifying assumptions and
methods); cf. Caldwell et al., supra note 15, at 115-16 (pointing out shortcomings of Steuerle/
Bakija model); id. at 111 (describing simulation model based on representative sample which
"ages, marries, divorces, fertilizes, educates, employs, unemploys, re-employs, retires, and
kills original sample members and their descendants" and calculates social security taxes and
benefits).
21 See Dean R. Leimer, A Guide to Social Security Money's Worth Issues, 58 Soc. SE_-
ctRrry BuLL. 3, 8. n.9 (1995). The simulation approach can be refined by using improved
data and analysis; with increasingly detailed hypothetical worker profiles, however, it becomes
correspondingly more difficult to obtain adequate data sources and perform the necessary anal-
ysis. See id.; see also Leimer, supra note 19, at 46-47 n.3.
22 See Creston M. Smith, The Social Security Administration's Continuous Work History
Sample, 52 Soc. SEcurrY BULL. 20 (1989); Duggan et al., supra note 9, at 8-9 (analyzing
continuous work history sample data for 1951 to 1988 and finding that blacks received "rela-
tively favorable" rates of return compared to the overall sample).
23 See Garrett, supra note 18, at 458-60; Coronado, supra note 18, at 153 (noting that
sample ignores earnings above the social security earnings cap and that records of individuals
are not linked with records of spouses).
24 BEACH & DAvis, supra note 16, at 15; but see Leimer, supra note 19, at 46 (discussing
rates of return for minority groups and concluding that existing studies of both the OASI and
DI programs suggest that "within cohorts nonwhites have received more favorable relative
treatment than whites, on average").
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Heritage Foundation report adopts several questionable assumptions
which tend to maximize racial differences in mortality rates. For exam-
ple, in calculating rates of return, the report assumes a uniform average
life expectancy for all black workers and another uniform average life
expectancy for all white workers. As a result, the report accentuates the
racial disparity in mortality rates while ignoring differences in income
levels and other socioeconomic factors.25 The report also assumes that
each hypothetical black or white worker lives exactly as long as the
group's average life expectancy. This assumption disregards the
probability that the hypothetical worker may die earlier or later than ex-
pected, and ignores the concomitant effects on rates of return.26 Further-
more, the report compares average life expectancies for hypothetical
black and white workers at the beginning of their working lives rather
than at retirement age. Since life expectancies tend to converge at higher
ages, the racial disparity is considerably smaller among workers who ac-
tually survive to collect old-age benefits than the report implies.27 To the
25 See BEACH & DAviS, supra note 10, at 21-22 (life expectancy assumptions); KLOLO
KUAKAZi, AFRICAN AMERICANS, isPANic AMERICANS, AND SOCIAL SECURrrY: THE SHORT-
COMINGS OF THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS 27-28 (Center on Budget and Policy Priori-
ties, 1998) ("failing to compare mortality rates for whites and minorities with the same income
levels.. .exaggerates the impact of race on rates of return"); BEACH & DAVIS, supra note 16, at
6 (calculating rate of return using average life expectancies, not adjusted by income level).
Recent studies suggest that controlling for variables other than race eliminates most, if not all,
of the difference between black and white mortality rates. See Leimer, supra note 19, at 45;
see also Paul L. Menchik, Economic Status as a Determinant of Mortality Among Black and
White Older Men: Does Poverty Kill?, 47 P6 PULATION STUDImS 427, 435 (1993) (finding 75
percent of differential black mortality rates attributable to economic and environmental vari-
ables); Richard G. Rogers, Living and Dying in the U.S.A.: Sociodemographic Determinants of
Death Among Blacks and Whites, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 287, 297-99 (1992) (attributing differential
black mortality rates to demographic, familial, and socioeconomic factors).
26 Workers who die before retirement receive no old-age benefits, but due to their re-
duced working years they also contribute less in payroll taxes. Long-lived workers receive
old-age benefits for more years although their payroll tax contributions cease at retirement.
See K iuA~ zi, supra note 25, at 11-13 (pointing out effect of report's methodology on ratio of
expected retirement years to expected working years); BEACH & DAviS, supra note 16, at 3-4
(defending use of "average life expectancy" rather than "expected value").
27 In general, individual life expectancy increases with attained age, and group life ex-
pectancies tend to converge. The following table shows life expectancies for black and white
women and men of specified ages in 1996:
WOMEN MEN
Black White Black White
Birth 74.2 79.6 66.1 73.8
Age 20 55.7 60.4 48.0 54.8
Age 40 37.0 41.0 31.0 36.3
Age 50 28.6 31.7 23.4 27.5
Age 65 17.2 19.0 13.9 15.8
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extent that the report overstates racial disparities in mortality rates, it
distorts the rate-of-return calculations and undermines the Heritage
Foundation's claim that "[d]ue to generally lower life expectancies,
[blacks] experience particularly poor rates of return from Social
Security."
28
In discussing the issue of mortality rates, the Heritage Foundation
report compares social security to an "imaginary lottery" in which one
contestant wins a prize and the others lose their stakes.29 The lottery
image highlights the mortality gamble inherent in any retirement-annuity
system: workers who die prematurely subsidize increased annuity bene-
fits for those who live the longest. Nevertheless, it would be misleading
to view workers who die before retirement as receiving no return at all
on their contributions. Despite its many redistributive features, social
security is fundamentally a program of insurance against loss of earnings
during retirement or disability, and, like any insurance system, it shifts
and spreads risk. Workers who die prematurely incur an ex post loss, but
they still receive the ex ante benefit of coverage throughout their lives.
The real issue is not whether social security involves a mortality gam-
ble-it clearly does-but whether the gamble is fair. If the existing
structure of old-age benefits systematically discriminates against blacks
or other minority groups, the problem could be rectified by providing
mandatory life insurance to neutralize the mortality risk.3o Presumably,
such a life insurance component, like the existing old-age annuity com-
ponent, would be based on uniform mortality rates without differentia-
tion by race or sex.31 Furthermore, in assessing the overall impact of the
existing system it is necessary to consider several key features that tend
to offset the discriminatory effects alleged in the Heritage Foundation
report.32
See 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACt, supra note 17, at 94 tbl.129.
28 BEACH & DAviS, supra note 10, at 10.
29 BEACH & DAvIs, supra note 16, at 4.
30 See Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE
SocIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLICs, AND ECONOMICS 38, 57 (R. Douglas Arnold et
al. eds., 1998).
31 Alternatively, old-age annuity benefits could be adjusted to reflect mortality differ-
ences based on race and sex. Such adjustments would increase annuity benefits for shorter-
lived groups (i.e., blacks and men, at least those who reached retirement age) while reducing
them for longer-lived groups (i.e., whites and women), and might produce some surprising net
transfers (e.g., from black women to white men). But see 1979 Advisory Council Report,
supra note 11, at 125 (rejecting "explicit differentiation among racial or ethnic groups" under
social security); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Ef-
fect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REv. 341, 373-76 (2000)
(discussing race- and sex-differentiated mortality tables).
32 See Alexa A. Hendley & Natasha F. Bilimoria, Minorities and Social Security: An
Analysis of Racial and Ethnic Differences in the Current Program, 62 SoC. SECURrrY BULL.
59, 61-63 (1999) (discussing importance for minorities of progressive benefit formula as well
SociAL SECURITY REFORM
C. COUNTERVAILING FEATURES
It is important at the outset to recognize that social security func-
tions as part of a larger tax-and-transfer system. Within that system, the
earned income tax credit (EITC)33 partially offsets the regressivity of
flat-rate payroll taxes for low-income workers. 34 The EITC in effect
subsidizes the payroll tax liability of eligible workers from general reve-
nues by means of a refundable tax credit.35 By failing to take the EITC
into account, the Heritage Foundation report may overstate the effective
rate of payroll taxes for black workers. 36 Similarly, by ignoring other
features of the tax-and-transfer system that implicitly reinforce the
progressivity of social security, 37 the Heritage Foundation report tends to
oversimplify and distort the impact of the existing system.
Another important feature ignored by the Heritage Foundation re-
port is the option of early retirement.38 Under the existing system, a
worker can elect to retire and begin receiving reduced old-age benefits as
early as age 62. Indeed, around two-thirds of all workers, including mi-
nority workers, do so. 39 The reduction in old-age benefits for workers
who retire early reflects the increase in the worker's retirement years
relative to working years, and is designed to be nearly neutral in present
value terms for workers of average longevity. For blacks and other
as disability and survivor benefits); 1979 Advisory Council Report, supra note 11, at 137
(rejecting claim that overall impact of social security is unfair to minorities).
33 See 26 U.S.C. § 32.
34 See George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor:
Proposals to Reform the Earned income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225, 230
(1994) ("[a]n important goal of the [EITC] program is to offset the Social Security taxes paid
by low-income workers"); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 534 (1995) (noting traditional view of
EITC as "a means of offsetting the adverse distributional and incentive effects of federal in-
come and payroll taxes on low-income workers"). As the EITC has expanded, it has also
come to be viewed as providing work incentives and offering a tax-based alternative to tradi-
tional public assistance programs; in addition, it is often portrayed as mitigating the regressive
effects of other tax proposals. See Yin et al., supra, at 230; Alstott, supra, at 534.
35 See Yin et al., supra note 34, at 283 n.193 ("the EITC has already decoupled the link
between Social Security taxes and benefits").
36 See KUAKAZi, supra note 25, at 14; John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit:
Participation, Compliance, and Antipoverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 63, 86 tbl.1 (1994)
(in 1990, 24 percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers were black). Further empirical study is needed
to assess the racial impact of the EITC, since a significant percentage of eligible households do
not actually participate in the EITC program. See id. at 65 (estimated 80 to 86 percent partici-
pation rate in 1990).
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 86 (1999) (targeting income taxation of social security benefits at
moderate- and high-income taxpayers).
38 See BEACH & DAvis, supra note 10, at 17 (assuming worker begins work at age 21
and continues working until entitled to full old-age benefit).
39 See KuAKAzI, supra note 25, at 15 ("about two-thirds of all workers, including minor-
ity workers, take early retirement"); GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 21 tbl.1-12 (in 1995, 58.3
percent of workers elected to receive old-age benefits before age 62, and another 19.5 percent
before age 65).
2000]
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groups with shorter-than-average life expectancies, however, early retire-
ment actually increases the rate of return on social security contributions
because the benefit reduction does not fully offset the disproportionate
increase in the ratio of retirement years to working years. 40 Thus, the
option of early retirement provides a net benefit to black workers as a
group.
Another key feature omitted from the Heritage Foundation report
involves the benefits payable to disabled workers and their dependents
and survivors. Given the strong positive correlation between income and
health, it should come as no surprise that a relatively large percentage of
recipients of disability and survivor benefits are black.41 Indeed, the dis-
ability component of social security appears to have a pronounced redis-
tributive effect in favor of blacks, which may outweigh any opposite
effect attributable to mortality rates.42 Moreover, there is evidence of a
disturbing upward trend in disability rates, especially among black work-
ers relative to white workers. 43 The Heritage Foundation report purports
to carve out the disability component as well as the pre-retirement survi-
vor component of social security from its analysis by ignoring both con-
tributions and benefits attributable to those components. 44 Although
40 See KuAKAZI, supra note 25, at 13-15.
41 In 1997, 10.3 percent of all social security beneficiaries were black, but blacks repre-
sented higher percentages of those receiving disability or survivor benefits, as shown in the
following table:
Black White Other
Total beneficiaries 10.3 86.3 2.9
Disabled workers 17.8 74.9 6.3
Spouses of disabled workers 14.0 77.3 7.7
Children of disabled workers 22.1 67.8 8.9
Survivors 13.5 82.9 2.9
These percentages are derived from data contained in the 1998 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 12, at 198 tbl.5.A6 (note that because persons of unknown race were not included
in the underlying data, the numbers in each row add up to slightly less than 100 percent). See
also Hendley & Bilimoria, supra note 32, at 62 ("A larger percentage of minority
groups.. .receive disability and survivor benefits than do whites.").
42 See KUAKAZI, supra note 25, at 24; Leimer, supra note 9, at 9 ("differences in such
factors as earnings levels, disability rates, and dependent beneficiary relationships appear to
work in favor of Nonwhites relative to Whites under the DI program and also appear to collec-
tively outweigh any opposing effect associated with differences in survival probabilities"); id.
at 27 (concluding that accumulated benefit/tax ratios suggest that, over time, the disability
component has produced "a net redistribution from males to females and a more pronounced
redistribution from Whites to Nonwhites"); 1979 Advisory Council Report, supra note 11, at
125-26 (noting that for minorities the effect of shorter life expectancy is offset by the effect of
disability and survivor benefits, as well as progressive benefit formula).
43 See Leimer, supra note 9, at 11.
44 See BEACH & DAVIs, supra note 16, at 8-9 (defending report's approach); cf.
KuA.AzI, supra note 25, at 23-25 (criticizing report's method of calculating the portion of
contributions allocable to the pre-retirement survivor component).
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many other studies also exclude the disability component in calculating
rates of return on social security, it is important to note that disability
benefits represent one of the most favorable features of social security
for blacks as a group.45
Finally, social security extends benefits to a worker's spouse and
eligible dependents, both during retirement or disability and after the
worker's death.46 These auxiliary and survivor benefits represent a
marked departure from individual equity because they supplement the
primary worker benefit at no additional cost to the worker or the recipi-
ents. Thus, these benefits substantially enhance the rates of return on
contributions for some households at the expense of others, based solely
on marital status and family relationships.
When auxiliary and survivor benefits were first introduced, they
were justified on grounds of social adequacy as a means of meeting the
presumably greater needs of workers with dependent family members.
Over time, however, the rationale and impact of these benefits have be-
come increasingly controversial.47 For example, the spousal benefit pro-
visions redistribute from unmarried individuals to married couples and
from two-earner couples to one-earner couples. 48 These provisions have
attracted criticism on the ground that they encourage married women to
stay at home rather than enter the paid workforce. 49 More generally,
since the auxiliary and survivor benefit provisions favor "traditional"
households, 50 they may be viewed as imposing an indirect penalty on
households with different family structures and earnings patterns.
Spousal benefits are concentrated among married couples in which
one spouse earns all (or nearly all) of the wages; the spousal benefit
declines or disappears as the couple's combined wages are split more
45 See KuAKAZI, supra note 25, at 21 ("African-Americans benefit disproportionately
from the disability and survivors components of Social Security. By removing these parts of
Social Security from its calculations, Heritage disregards the elements of Social Security most
favorable to them.").
46 See GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 15-16 (describing auxiliary and survivor benefits).
47 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 14, at 1225-32, and sources cited therein.
48 Under the "dual entitlement" provisions, the total benefit payable to a worker's spouse
is limited to the greater of (1) the spouse's auxiliary benefit or (2) the primary benefit attributa-
ble to the spouse's own earnings, if any. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(3)(A). Thus, a working
spouse may be viewed as receiving no marginal return on contributions until the primary
benefit exceeds the auxiliary benefit.
49 See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gen-
der Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 987-88, 996-1005 (1993); see also Becker,
supra note 14, at 279-83.
50 See McCaffery, supra note 49, at 999 (arguing that s6cial security reinforces bias in
favor of "traditional" families with a "working husband" and a "stay-at-home wife"); Becker,
supra note 14, at 283 (arguing that social security systematically favors "those who have suc-
cessfully fulfilled men's traditional breadwinner role over those who fulfilled women's tradi-
tional roles").
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equally between the respective spouses. Recent studies indicate that at
all income levels black couples are more likely than white couples to
earn equal (or nearly equal) wages 5 1 and that black women are less
likely than white women to collect spousal benefits.52 These studies sug-
gest that the distribution of spousal benefits may be racially skewed.
5 3
Nevertheless, the distribution of social security benefits is influenced by
so many variables-marriage, divorce, number of children, work history,
earnings level, health, and mortality, to name a few-that any conclusion
about the rate of return on contributions for black households remains
highly speculative.54 The racial impact of social security is undoubtedly
far more subtle and complex than portrayed in the Heritage Foundation
report.
II. PRIVATIZATION-A BETTER DEAL?
In addition to the claim that social security represents an especially
bad deal for blacks, the Heritage Foundation report argues that blacks
would fare better under a fully privatized system. Even if the first claim
remains unproven, the proposal to move toward a privatized system de-
serves close attention. While privatization has taken center stage in the
debate over social security reform, the implications for blacks and other
minority groups have only recently begun to be explored.
A. GOALS OF A FULLY PRIVATIZED SYSTEM
Full privatization, as contemplated by the Heritage Foundation re-
port, implies the conversion of social security from the existing defined-
benefit system to a defined-contribution system with private accounts
51 See Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The
Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1504-05 tbls.3.5, 3.6 (1997); see also Howard
M. Iams, Earnings of Couples: A Cohort Analysis, 56 Soc. SECURrry. BULL. 22, 29 (1993)
(finding that, among married women born in the 1940's and 1950's, blacks were significantly
less likely than others to have low earnings relative to their husbands).
52 See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61
U. Prrr. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 35-36, on file with authors); 1998 STA'ns-
TICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 12, at 184 tbl.5.A1. By contrast, the same study found that
black women and white women are equally likely to receive auxiliary benefits as surviving
spouses. See Moore, supra, at 36-37; 1998 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 12, at 184
tbl.5.A1.
53 Cf. Garrett, supra note 18, at 460 (noting that if poor households have higher second-
earner participation rates compared to the general population, their return will be lower).
54 See Brown, supra note 51, at 1490 n.136 (noting that marriage rate is lower among
black women than white women); Moore, supra note 52, at 33, 113 & 114 (noting differences
between black and white women in marriage and divorce rates); Regina Austin, Nest Eggs and
Stormy Weather: Law, Culture, and Black Women's Lack of Wealth, 65 U. CiN. L. Rnv. 767,
769-70 (1997) (comparing wealth and family structure by race).
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similar to 401(k) plans or IRAs.55 Thus, instead of levying payroll taxes
on the wages of current workers to pay specified benefits to retired work-
ers and their families, a privatized system would use payroll taxes to
fund private accounts for individual workers.56 Each worker would have
control over the investment of his or her account and would be entitled to
withdraw the accumulated account balance upon retirement.
57
According to the Heritage report, a privatized system would yield
higher rates of return for current and future workers (and especially for
black workers) on their contributions for several reasons. First, a de-
fined-contribution system would eliminate the mortality gamble inherent
in the existing defined-benefit system: shorter-lived workers would no
longer subsidize longer-lived workers, and benefits would be linked
much more closely to contributions. Second, workers would have access
to private capital markets, which have historically yielded relatively high
returns compared to the existing system.58 Finally, private accounts
would allegedly promote increased national savings and capital forma-
tion for the benefit of future generations.5 9 In effect, the Heritage Foun-
dation report claims that a rising tide of privatization would lift all
boats.60 The claimed benefits of privatization, like the claimed unfair-
ness of the existing system, deserve closer scrutiny.
B. MAINTAINING SocIAL ADEQUACY
Any move in the direction of privatization raises a fundamental con-
cem about maintaining social adequacy. This is due in part to the differ-
ence between a system of defined benefits and one of defined
55 See BEACH & DAviS, supra note 10, at 2 ("safe investment accounts similar to 401(k)
plans").
56 For this purpose, payroll taxes include both the employer's and the employee's share.
See BEACH & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 17. However, not all payroll taxes would be diverted to
private accounts; a portion would continue to fund the disability and pre-retirement survivor
components of the existing system. See id. at 17, 20-21 (defending report's approach); cf.
KUAKA7I, supra note 25, at 22-25 (criticizing report's assumptions and methodology).
57 The features of advance funding, investment diversification, and private accounts are
analytically distinct. In theory, any one of them could be implemented without the others.
Nevertheless, most privatization proposals include all three features. See John Geanakoplos et
al., Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?, in FRAM-
iNG THE SOCIAL SEcuRITy DEBATE, supra note 30, at 137, 138-41; Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, Perspectives on Social Security Reform, 4 FLA. TAX Rv. 417, 418 (1999).
58 See BEACH & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 10-14 (comparing rates of return on social
security and alternative private investments).
59 See BEACH & DAVIS, supra note 10, at 5-6 (arguing that social security "crowds out"
private savings for low- and middle-income workers and impedes capital formation); id. at 15
(arguing that a privatized system would encourage capital formation and economic growth).
60 See id. at 16 ("For almost every type of worker and family, retirement under Social
Security means receiving fewer dollars in old age and passing on less wealth to the next
generation than they could if allowed to place their current Social Security tax dollars in pri-
vate retirement investments.").
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contributions: the former tends to facilitate risk-pooling and redistribu-
tion, while the latter tends to emphasize individual equity.61 To preserve
a retirement safety net for low earners, some proposals would privatize
only a portion of social security while retaining a defined-benefit compo-
nent to provide higher benefits for low-income participants through ei-
ther a progressively-scaled benefit or a flat minimum benefit. 62 By
making the redistributive function of the defined-benefit component
more isolated and visible, partial privatization might merely lead to in-
creased political pressure for full privatization from middle- and high-
income participants.63 Of course, even in a fully privatized system, it
would be technically (though perhaps not politically) possible to preserve
an element of progressivity by adjusting credited contributions upward
for participants with low incomes and downward for those with high
incomes.64
The Heritage Foundation report, however, contemplates dismantling
the existing system of old-age and survivor insurance and replacing it as
soon as possible with a fully privatized system purged of all traces of
progressivity.65 In its enthusiasm for maximizing individual equity, the
Heritage report gives no weight at all to considerations of social ade-
quacy. Apparently, workers facing retirement with inadequate assets due
to low earnings, bad investments, or other factors, would be relegated to
the public assistance rolls. The net result might well be to trade social
security for "an enlarged [public assistance] program plus a compulsory
savings plan.' '66
61 See Diamond, supra note 30, at 40-45.
62 See, e.g., 1994-1996 ADVISORY CouNcii. REPORT, supra note 15, at 29 (progressive
benefits under "individual account" (IA) plan); see id. at 31 (flat minimum benefit under "per-
sonal security account" (PSA) plan).
63 See Hugh Heclo, A Political Science Perspective on Social Security Reform, in FRAM.
ING THE SOCIAL SEcuurrv DEBATE, supra note 30, at 65, 88 (arguing that "privatized accounts
will offer a ready-made vehicle for better-off workers to secede from the fate of other work-
ers" and will "encourage a two-tier pension system that can easily evolve into a division of
political constituencies between the weak and the strong"); Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution
Under a Partially Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 985 (1998) ("the
real risk with partial privatization is the inexorable pressure it would create for full
privatization.").
64 See Michael J. Boskin et al., Personal Security Accounts: A Proposal for Fundamental
Social Security Reform, in SOCIAL SECURrrY AND PRIVATE PENsIONs: PROVIDING FOR RETRE-
mENT IN Tim TwENTY-RmsT CENTURY 179 (Susan M. Wachter ed., 1988). A similar result
could be achieved by making additional contributions to accounts of low-income participants
from general revenues. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al., Social Security: Privatization and
Progressivity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (1998).
65 The Heritage Foundation report purports to retain the disability insurance component
of the existing system. See BEACH & DAVIs, supra note 16, at 17, 20-21 (defending report's
approach); KIJAKAZI, supra note 25, at 22-25 (criticizing report's assumptions and
methodology).
66 1994-1996 ADVISORY CoutcL REPORT, supra note 15, at 71 (discussing risks of par-
tial privatization with flat minimum benefit).
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C. TRANSITION COSTS
The Heritage Foundation report also ignores the transition costs of
replacing the existing pay-as-you-go system with an advance-funded sys-
tem of private accounts. 67 The existing system already has a built-in
"unfunded liability," presently estimated at around $9 trillion, which rep-
resents the net present value of future benefits already promised to cur-
rent retirees and workers under the existing system based on their
previously credited earnings.68 If payroll taxes were diverted to private
accounts for current workers, these promised benefits would presumably
have to be financed by issuing new public debt, increasing taxes, or cur-
tailing other public expenditures. 69 Thus, it appears that the transition to
any sort of privatized system would involve large costs which in the near
term would reduce or even eliminate the benefits of nominally higher
rates of return under the new system. The method of financing the tran-
sition costs would determine how the burden would be spread among
current and future generations. 70 Although abrupt tax increases or bene-
fit cuts might seem preferable in terms of efficiency, there would un-
doubtedly be strong political pressure to impose transition costs as
gradually and imperceptibly as possible, especially since the long-term
benefits of privatization would not be immediately obvious.
71
The existing system's unfunded liability can also be viewed in terms
of the compounded value of intergenerational net transfers that occurred
during the start-up phase when early generations of workers and their
families received extraordinarily high rates of return.72 As long as the
payroll tax base continued to expand, the pay-as-you-go system made it
possible to shift the cost of those transfers forward to successive genera-
67 See KIJAKAZI, supra note 25, at 15-17.
68 See Stephen C. Goss, Measuring Solvency in the Social Security System, in PRoSPECTS
FOR SOCIAL SECUmrTY REFORM 16, 34 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter PROS-
PECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM].
69 Some proponents of privatization have suggested that projected surpluses in the uni-
fied budget offer a one-time opportunity to finance transition costs. Those surpluses, however,
are largely attributable to temporary accumulations of payroll tax revenues that have already
been taken into account in measuring the existing system's unfunded liability. See R. Douglas
Arnold, The Political Feasibility of Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SEcuRrrY
DEBATE, supra note 30, at 389, 414 (describing "stealth privatization" proposals).
70 See 1994-1996 ADVISORY CoUNciL REPORT, supra note 15, at 28 (IA plan, proposing
1.6 percent private accounts funded from immediate payroll tax increase); id. at 32 (PSA plan,
proposing 5 percent private accounts, with transition costs financed from 1.52 percent payroll
tax increase over 72 years).
71 See Arnold, supra note 69, at 397-408.
72 Indeed, according to one study, despite the progressive tilt in the benefit formula, high
earners have received the largest net transfers in absolute terms. See STrauEuE & BAKuA,
supra note 18, at 108, 110 (comparing social security to an imaginary "welfare system" in
which "the rich received back tens of thousands of dollars for paying a few dollars of tax,
while the very poor received a grant of a few hundred dollars without paying any taxes.").
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tions of workers. As the baby boomers begin to retire, however, the pay-
roll tax base will shrink relative to promised benefits. Thus, the low
rates of return projected for current and future workers on their social
security contributions are attributable to past net transfers rather than to
waste or fraud in the existing system.73 In calculating rates of return, the
Heritage Foundation report takes the unfunded liability into account
under the existing system while ignoring it under the privatized system.
As a result, the report overstates the difference in the rates of return
under the respective systems.
D. RISKS AND RETURNS
Like most privatization proposals, the Heritage Foundation report
emphasizes the relatively high projected rates of return that could be
achieved by investing in private capital markets.74 The comparison with
the existing system is potentially misleading, however, because the re-
port fails to adjust the projected rates of return to reflect the risks of the
different portfolios or the increased administrative costs of a privatized
system. Compared to government bonds, private equities tend to have
relatively high-expected yields which reflect correspondingly high levels
of risk. Nevertheless, investors who hold optimally diversified portfolios
presumably would not choose to invest more heavily in private equities,
since doing so would increase their exposure to market risk above the
existing (and by hypothesis already optimal) level. By contrast, con-
strained investors who would otherwise lack access to private capital
markets might benefit from a diversified investment strategy. 75 For these
investors, however, the potentially higher returns from diversification
could be achieved even in a centralized fund without private accounts.
76
A system of private accounts would offer individual workers a
greater choice of investment strategies, but this flexibility would not be
costless.77 Presumably private accounts would be subject to annual fees
to cover administrative costs. If structured as a flat annual charge, these
73 See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 57, at 144-48.
74 The Heritage Foundation report, for example, assumes that workers could invest their
private accounts in alternative investment portfolios ranging from private equities to govern-
ment bonds. The report assumes real rates of return of 5.7 percent on equities, 2.8 percent on
bonds, and 4.25 percent on a blended portfolio. See BEACH & DAvis, supra note 10, at 18-19;
BEACH & DAvis, supra note 16, at 11-12.
75 See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 57, at 151-52.
76 See id. at 139. The main objection to achieving diversification through a centralized
fund focuses on the perceived risks of "social investing" and government interference in cor-
porate decision-making. See Theodore J. Angelis, Public Investment in Private Markets: What
Are the Right Questions?, in FRAmING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 30, at 287,
290-93, 304-10.
77 See Olivia S. Mitchell, Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Sys-
tems, in PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY 403, 404 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998).
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costs would fall disproportionately on smaller accounts;78 as a result, low
earners would receive lower rates of return on their investments even if
they chose exactly the same investments as high earners. Alternatively,
administrative costs could be structured as an annual charge equal to a
fixed percentage of the balance in each account. As one recent study has
pointed out, an annual charge of one percent of the balance in a private
account could produce a net reduction of around 20 percent in the accu-
mulated account balance over the course of a 40-year working career.79
Compared to a centralized fund, a system of private accounts would
likely incur substantially higher administrative costs that should be taken
into account in projecting rates of return.
Even if a privatized system might ultimately produce higher rates of
return for many workers, moving from a system of defined benefits to
one of defined contributions would expose individual workers to unprec-
edented levels of investment risk. Workers with investment experience
or simple good luck would receive the highest returns, while others
would be left behind. In view of the strong positive correlation between
income, education, and investment behavior, it seems likely that high
returns would be concentrated among high earners. Even very prudent
investors with well-diversified portfolios would experience volatile re-
turns: short-term market fluctuations could produce substantial differ-
ences in the account balances of workers who reached retirement age at
different times but were similarly situated in other respects.80 Many
workers, however, would not make prudent investment choices. Some
would be tempted to take excessive risks in the hope of reaping ex-
traordinary gains, while others would be unreasonably risk-averse. In
either case, many workers would be disappointed with their investment
outcomes and would presumably demand some sort of government guar-
antee or assistance to ensure an adequate retirement income.
Many proponents of privatization appear remarkably confident that
a system of private accounts would spur workers to become successful
investors. The experience with defined-contribution arrangements such
as 401(k) plans and IRAs, however, suggests that this confidence may be
78 For example, assuming a flat annual fee of $30, a worker with an annual wage of
$15,000 who made annual contributions of $300 (i.e., 2 percent of payroll) to a private account
that yielded a 5 percent rate of return would receive a negative rate of return for the first two
years. See Francis X. Cavanaugh, Discussion, in FRAMING TIM SOCIAL SEcURITY DEBATE,
supra note 30, at 319, 325; see also 1998 STATISTICAL SUPPLEmENT, supra note 12, at 173
tbl.4.B7 (in 1995, 46.69 percent of workers covered by social security earned less than
$15,000).
79 See Diamond, supra note 30, at 54.
80 See Lawrence H. Thompson, Individual Uncertainty in Retirement Income Planning
Under Different Public Pension Regimes, in FRAMING a SocIAL SEcURITY DEBATE, supra
note 30, at 113, 127.
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misplaced. 81 Although income and education appear to be better
predictors of individual investment behavior than race, a system of pri-
vate accounts would likely have varying impacts on different racial and
ethnic groups. 82 Individuals with relatively low family incomes and little
education tend to choose investments with lower levels of risk and corre-
spondingly lower returns than those with higher incomes and more edu-
cation.83 Thus, it seems quite likely that groups with relatively low
levels of income and education, including many black workers,8 4 would
receive disproportionately low returns under a system of private ac-
counts.85 It might be argued, of course, that black workers should wel-
come a new opportunity for private saving and capital formation, but this
merely highlights existing gaps in financial assets86 and investment expe-
rience.87 If workers are to assume full responsibility for their own in-
vestment decisions, it seems appropriate, at the very least, to provide
them with the necessary education and training to make prudent invest-
81 See Social Security: Capital Markets and Educational Issues Associated With Individ-
ual Accounts, Report to the Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106TH Cong., 59
(1999)("It is clear that among those who save through their company's retirement programs or
on their own, there are large percentages of the investing population who do not fully under-
stand what they are doing."); cf. B. Douglas Bernheim, Financial Illiteracy, Education, and
Retirement Saving, in LivNG wrri DEFnIED CONTRIBUTION PmNSIONS: REMAKING RFSPONSI-
BiLrry FOR R~rmuBmErr 38, 43 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) ("the
existing literature demonstrates that most Americans know little about managing personal fi-
nances and their choices reflect this ignorance"). See generally Moore, supra note 31, at 16-
20.
82 See SocIAL SEcURITY AND MiNorrEs, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Cynthia M.
Fagnoni); see also Bermheim, supra note 81, at 47 ("[d]ifferences based on gender and race are
statistically significant, even holding other variables (such as education and earnings)
constant").
83 See id. at 1-2.
84 See 1998 STATnsTicAL ABsTRAcr, supra note 17, at 405 tbl.648 (in 1997, 16.6 percent
of black civilian workers were college graduates, compared to 29.5 percent of white civilian
workers); id. at 436 tbi.696 (in 1997, full-time black workers had median weekly earnings of
$400, compared to $519 for full-time white workers).
85 See Social Security and Minorities, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Cynthia M.
Fagnoni) (finding that, controlling for family income and years of education, black IRA hold-
ers are "somewhat less likely" than whites to invest in stocks and mutual fund shares).
86 See Maijorie Honig, Minorities Face Retirement: Worklife Disparities Repeated?, in
FORECASTING RETIREMENr NEEDS AND RETiREMENT WEaTH 235, 235 (Olivia S. Mitchell et
al. eds., 2000) (noting that, in 1993, net worth-including financial assets and housing equity,
but not private pensions or social security-of median black household was less than one-tenth
that of median white household); OLIVER & SHAPiRo, supra note 1, at 106-07 (noting that
racial disparities in asset composition are greatest among low-income households); James P.
Smith, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study, 30 J.
Hum. REsotmcas S158, S167 (Supp. 1995) (noting that financial assets of average black
household are "stunningly low").
87 See Andrew F. Brimmer, Income, Wealth, and Investment Behavior in the Black Com-
munity, 78 AM. EcON. REv. 151, 154-55 (1988) (blacks tend to have relatively little experience
with stock market investments due to economic, social, and cultural factors); Moran & Whit-
ford, supra note 11, at 765 (noting racial disparity in stock and mutual fund holdings); see also
Moore, supra note 31, at 21-23.
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ment decisions. Unless all workers are properly equipped to take advan-
tage of new investment opportunities, those opportunities may perpetuate
existing racial inequalities. The Heritage Foundation report, however,
fails to specify what measures, if any, would be taken to provide equal
investment opportunities.88
E. DisABILrry INSURANCE AND AuXILARY BENEFrTS
A system of private accounts would pose special risks for disabled
workers and their families. Proponents of privatization often ignore disa-
bility insurance since it is possible, in theory, to separate this component
from the rest of the system.89 Under a partially privatized system, disa-
bility benefits could be retained as part of a residual defined-benefit tier.
This approach would generally require significant cuts in disability bene-
fits, however, reflecting the reduced size of the defined-benefit tier.90
Given the relatively high percentage of black workers and their families
who receive disability benefits under the existing system, they would be
especially hard hit by across-the-board cuts in these benefits. 91 Further-
more, even if workers could obtain supplemental disability insurance
through private markets, the cost of such insurance would likely be high-
est for those with the greatest need.92 The loss of disability benefits
could be especially disastrous for workers who became disabled early in
their working lives, since they would have little opportunity to accumu-
late adequate retirement savings in their private accounts.
Auxiliary benefits for spouses or survivors would presumably be
scaled back in a partially privatized system, or eliminated entirely in a
fully privatized system. The brunt of these reductions would fall on the
groups that receive the greatest benefits under the existing system. Thus,
for example, a reduction in spousal benefits would fall more heavily on
88 See Social Security and Minorities, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Cynthia M.
Fagnoni) ("It is not clear who would provide such information to workers under a restructured
Social Security system that included mandatory individual accounts.").
89 See Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing Program Solvency, Report
to the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., 59 (1998) [hereinafter Different Approaches].
The Heritage Foundation report, for example, purports to carve out both contributions and
benefits allocable to disability insurance from its analysis. See supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
90 See Different Approaches, supra note 89, at 60 (reporting that the PSA plan might
reduce existing level of disability benefits by as much as 30 percent).
91 See supra note 41 and accompanying text; KuAKAzi, supra note 25, at 23.
92 See Different Approaches, supra note 89, at 59 (suggesting that under a voluntary
private disability insurance program "comprehensive disability protection would be available
to some only at a high price," due to problem of adverse selection); KuAAZI, supra note 25, at
23 ("The greater the physical risk of the occupation and the less healthy the worker, the greater
the probability of not qualifying for coverage and the higher the premium for those who do
qualify.").
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white married couples than on black married couples, 93 but a reduction in
survivor benefits would fall especially heavily on black children. 94
F. ANNUITIZATION
Proposals to convert social security to a system of private accounts
also raise issues concerning the timing and form of distributions. Some
privatization proposals would allow workers to make lump-sum with-
drawals from their private accounts at any time during retirement and to
leave any remaining balance at death to designated beneficiaries. 95 By
contrast, other proposals would require that workers draw down their
accumulated account balances in the form of an annuity at retirement, to
ensure a regular stream of benefits throughout retirement.96 If the pri-
mary goal of a privatized system is to provide retirement security for
workers and their families, some degree of mandatory annuitization
seems appropriate to prevent workers from dissipating their private ac-
counts before death.97 Indeed, in the case of married workers, there may
be good reasons to provide protection for surviving spouses in the form
of joint-and-survivor annuities, by analogy to the existing rules for quali-
fied pension plans.98 Nevertheless, full annuitization would increase the
implicit subsidy to longer-lived groups (e.g., women, and especially
white women) at the expense of shorter-lived groups (e.g., men, and es-
pecially black men).99 A possible compromise solution would be to re-
quire annuitization of private accounts only up to a specified dollar
93 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (noting racial impact of spousal
benefits).
94 See supra note 41 (noting racial impact of survivor benefits for children); cf. Moore,
supra note 31, at 77 (curtailing surviving spouse benefits would affect "women of all races
approximately equally").
95 See, e.g., 1994-1996 ADviSORY CouNcIL REPORT, supra note 15, at 30,32 (PSA plan).
The Heritage Foundation report does not specify any restrictions on withdrawals from private
accounts.
96 See, e.g., id. at 28 (IA plan).
97 By the same token, it would be important to resist political pressure to allow workers
to tap their private accounts before retirement, since this would undermine the purpose of
retirement saving. See Heclo, supra note 63, at 84-85 (pointing out that if restrictions against
early withdrawal or borrowing are not maintained "many persons will likely reach retirement
age with their personal accounts depleted for all sorts of good causes that occurred during their
working lives"); Thompson, supra note 80, at 132 (noting that existing law permits early
withdrawals for home purchases and for medical or educational expenses, with the result that
"a substantial portion of what is set aside in individual retirement savings programs may be
dissipated prior to retirement").
98 See 1994-1996 ADvisoRY CoUNCiL REPORT, supra note 15, at 28 (IA plan, providing
joint-and-survivor annuity as default option for married workers, subject to spousal waiver);
see also Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact of Social Security Reform on
Women's Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 375, 398-402 (1999) (discussing
role of joint-and-survivor annuities in protecting surviving spouses).
99 Mandatory annuitization might help to bring down the overall cost of annuities by
mitigating existing problems of adverse selection, but in any annuity system based on uniform
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amount or percentage level. This approach would leave workers free to
consume the rest of their accounts during retirement or dispose of them
at death,100 but would also raise politically sensitive issues concerning
the required level of annuitization. 10 1
G. WEALTH DISPARITIES
For more than two decades, economists have debated whether social
security significantly depresses private savings. 10 2 Despite the lack of
professional consensus,10 3 the Heritage Foundation report confidently as-
serts that the existing payroll taxes crowd out private savings: because
the bulk of payroll taxes collected each year are paid out to current retir-
ees and used for personal consumption, current workers (especially
lower-income workers) are deprived of opportunities to save and invest
productively. 104 By contrast, the Heritage Foundation report assumes
that a privatized system would increase capital formation and spur in-
vestment: payroll taxes would be "transformed into investments, adding
to the capital stock of the nation and enhancing productivity and eco-
nomic growth."' 05 Apparently, the benefits of enhanced economic
growth would eventually trickle down to lower-income workers.
10 6
mortality tables, the problem of different average life expectancies for various groups would
remain.
100 See Kent A. Smetters, Thinking About Social Security's Trust Fund, in PROSPECTS FOR
SOCIAL SEcURrrY REFORM, supra note 68, at 201, 214 (arguing that full annuitization may not
be optimal, and that "[alt least some lump-sum disbursement will be desirable for the purpose
of making a bequest, giving inter-vivos transfers to children (e.g., as a down payment on a
house), or holding a buffer for medical and non-medical expenses faced by beneficiaries and
their heirs").
101 If the required level were set too high, the effect would be indistinguishable from full
annuitization for many workers. On the other hand, if it were set too low, the government
might be called on to guarantee a minimum annuity benefit, which would raise problems of
cost and moral hazard.
102 The debate involves the net effect of two opposing forces. On one hand, to the extent
that social security benefits are perceived as a replacement for other household wealth, private
savings may decline (the "replacement effect"); on the other hand, to the extent that social
security benefits induce early retirement, they may actually increase private savings by encour-
aging individuals to save more over a shorter working career to finance a longer retirement
(the "retirement effect"). See Burke & McCouch, supra note 14, at 1242-43.
103 See id. at 1242 & n.199 (citing studies and noting that evidence concerning the magni-
tude of social security's effect on savings is "at best ambiguous and inconclusive").
104 See BEACH & DAvIs, supra note 10, at 5 ("today the high payroll taxes needed to pay
those current benefits crowd out private retirement investments"); id. at 6 (arguing that social
security acts as "a drag on future generations" by "taxing away one generation's opportunity to
help the next generation start earning at a higher level"); id. at 15 ("Social Security taxes are
consumed primarily in paying benefits to current retirees who spend nearly all of their income
on personal consumption items").
105 Id. at 15.
106 See id. at 16 (arguing that increased saving and investment by higher-income workers
in a privatized system could "quite possibly" provide employment for other workers).
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The Heritage Foundation report's attempt to blame social security
for low savings among lower-income workers seems disingenuous.
10 7
This line of attack echoes the charge of "over-annuitization" leveled
against social security by critics who argue that lower-income workers
have little incentive to save for retirement if their future consumption
opportunities compare favorably with their current circumstances.108
Much the same could be said of any other program that seeks to provide
a social safety net.'0 9 By logical extension, it could be argued that work
effort and private savings would be increased by dismantling social se-
curity altogether." 0
The persistent racial gap in household wealth defies easy explana-
tion. 1' Conventional measures of household wealth focus on "personal
net worth," which includes both financial assets and consumption-type
assets net of liabilities.112 In measuring the distribution of wealth at re-
tirement, however, economists tend to define household wealth more
broadly to embrace the present value of expected social security benefits
107 See BEACH & DAvis, supra note 10, at 5-6 ('The inability of poor workers to accumu-
late enough savings to leave a nest egg to their children can mean that their children will be as
dependent as their parents could be on their monthly Social Security check. It means that poor
communities will not have as much 'home grown' capital with which to create new jobs and
sources of income.").
108 See Martin Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Ac-
cumulation, 82 J. POL. ECON. 905, 920 (1974) ("For middle- and low-income families, social
security is a complete substitute for a substantial rate of private saving."). But cf KATHLEEN
McGARRY & ANDREV DAVENPORT, PENSIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 13 (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6171, 1997) (disputing claim of over-
annuitization).
109 See R. Glenn Hubbard et al., Precautionary Saving and Social Insurance, 103 J. POL.
EcoN. 360, 372 (1995) ("lower-income households may rationally accumulate proportionately
less than higher-income households because of the existence of an asset-based, means-tested
social insurance 'safety net"').
110 See Martin Feldstein, The Missing Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform,
86 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 8 n.26 (1996) (suggesting that "the optimal level of Social Security
benefits may be zero").
111 See Smith, supra note 86, at S166 ("we know far more about racial and ethnic income
deficits. than about the corresponding wealth disparities"); id. at S180 (noting that "minority
wealth disparities are due in part to differential inheritances and desired bequests as inequities
perpetuate themselves across generations [and] to lower minority incomes and poorer health");
Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composi-
tion, 105 Q.J. EcoN. 321, 332, 334 (1990) (rejecting hypothesis that wealth disparities are
primarily attributable to racial differences in saving behavior, and suggesting that differences
in intergenerational transfers are more likely explanation); see also OLIVER & SHAPIRO, Supra
note 1, at 50 ("Wealth is one indicator of material disparity that captures the historical legacy
of low wages, personal and organizational discrimination, and institutionalized racism.").
112 See Honig, supra note 86, at 244-45. Net financial assets may be more reliable than
personal net worth as an indicator of a household's power to accumulate additional wealth.
See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 767-68 ("Net financial assets are most likely to
produce additional income and wealth."); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note I, at 58-59 (noting
that consumption-type assets are unlikely to be converted into other forms of wealth).
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and private pensions in addition to personal net worth. 113 Since social
security benefits are more equally distributed across racial groups than
personal net worth and private pensions," 4 it is hardly surprising that the
racial gap in household wealth narrows substantially when social security
is taken into account.115 The Heritage Foundation report ignores the ef-
fect of social security benefits in mitigating racial wealth disparities at
retirement. Despite this equalizing effect, wealth disparities between
black and white households that arise during working years are likely to
continue during retirement. Given that the median black household may
have less than half the wealth of its white counterpart at retirement,
116
replacing social security with a system of private accounts would likely
have a significant adverse impact on standards of living during retire-
ment for many black households.
By ignoring transition costs, the Heritage Foundation report man-
ages to portray full privatization as a "win-win" proposition offering
higher private saving, investment, and economic growth for future gener-
ations with no acknowledged sacrifice in living standards for current
generations. To the extent that current generations would bear the transi-
tion costs, however, their levels of consumption would inevitably be re-
duced. Proponents of full privatization may believe that a reduction in
the living standards of current workers is an acceptable price for the
long-term benefits of economic growth. However, the inherent tradeoff
between the well-being of current and future generations should be ad-
dressed explicitly, especially if future generations are likely to be better
off in any event due to rising productivity and technological advances.
117
113 See Honig, supra note 86, at 237; Smith, supra note 86, at S159.
114 See Smith, supra note 86, at S178; see also Honig, supra note 86, at 243. While
private pension wealth is more evenly distributed than total wealth, significant racial dispari-
ties persist. See Honig, supra note 86, at 245 ("it is the inclusion of social security wealth, not
pension wealth, that narrows the gap between white and minority households"); see also IN-
COME OF THE POPULATION 55 OR OLDER, supra note 2, at 13 tbl.I.5 (reporting that in 1996, 4
percent of units age 65 or older in the lowest income quintile, compared to 43 percent of those
in the highest quintile, received income from private pensions or annuities).
115 One recent study found that, taking only personal net worth into account, mean house-
hold wealth of black households was only 2 percent of that of white households; taking social
security and private pension benefits into account, however, brought the ratio up to 46 percent.
See Smith, supra note 86, at S179 (noting that social security wealth comprises over 40 per-
cent of total black household wealth, compared to only 25 percent of white household wealth);
see also Honig, supra note 86, at 245-46.
116 See Honig, supra note 86, at 245-46 (even taking into account social security and
private pension wealth, the expected level of wealth at retirement for the median black house-
hold is still less than half that of the median white household); see also id. at 246 ("in many
black households, the role of second earners in financing post-retirement consumption may be
pivotal").
117 See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 57, at 150 (arguing that the focus of debate should
be on identifying and comparing tradeoffs rather than on whether there is a "free lunch").
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The Heritage Foundation report seeks to buttress its capital-forma-
tion argument by suggesting that a privatized system would allow black
households to achieve an optimal level of bequests. 118 This is essentially
a variant of the over-annuitization argument. Proponents of privatization
often maintain that individual workers should be allowed to choose what
portion, if any, of their retirement assets to annuitize. Retirees who
choose "a more thrifty life style than the general public might deem ap-
propriate" would then be free to pass on their accumulated retirement
wealth to their heirs." 9 According to this view, mandatory annuitization
tends to interfere with bequest motives, leading to higher levels of retire-
ment consumption and smaller bequests.
120
Given the pronounced racial disparities in income and wealth, a
similar disparity in bequests should come as no surprise.' 2 ' The relative
paucity of bequests among black households may be explained, at least
in part, by differences in savings attributable to lower lifetime income
and poorer health. In addition, since black workers tend to have shorter-
than-average life expectancies, the effect of mandatory annuitization is to
decrease their net bequeathing power.' 22 Thus, Heritage Foundation's
claim concerning the effect of social security on bequests may merely
reiterate the point that mandatory annuitization involves a mortality gam-
ble which benefits longer-lived groups at the expense of shorter-lived
groups. To the extent that mortality risks are skewed, they could be neu-
tralized by providing mandatory life insurance. 123 This does not imply,
however, that a system of retirement security should not require at least
some level of annuitization.
118 See BEACH & DAviS, supra note 10, at 16 (suggesting that a privatized system might
enable a hypothetical black worker to nearly double her rate of return under the existing sys-
tem "and pass on the remainder .. .to her children"); see also MARTIN FELDSTEIN & ELENA
RANGUELOVA, THE ECONOMICS OF BEQUESTS IN PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 2 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7065, 1999) (private accounts would "give
middle and lower income individuals the opportunity to accumulate wealth and make signifi-
cant bequests"); id. at 3 (justifying mandatory savings as a means of "helping individuals to
make the bequests that they would like to make but lack the ability to achieve").
119 1994-1996 ADvisORY COUNCm REPORT, supra note 15, at 117 (statement of Joan T.
Bok).
120 See id. The underlying assumption is apparently that there is a higher marginal pro-
pensity to consume social security wealth than other "ordinary" wealth. See Feldstein, supra
note 108, at 916 ("a large portion of ordinary wealth is held by a small fraction of households
for whom bequests and the accumulation of larger fortunes are more important than saving for
retirement").
121 See Smith, supra note 86, at S176 (nearly one in three white households reported a
financial inheritance, compared to one in ten minority households); Moran & Whitford, supra
note 11, at 772 (noting racial disparity in gifts and inheritances).
122 Workers with relatively short life-spans receive a correspondingly short stream of an-
nuity payments. In addition, mandatory annuitization may undermine bequeathing power to
the extent that there is a greater marginal propensity to consume annuitized wealth than other
types of wealth. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
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More broadly, the argument for bequest-oriented saving reflects a
view of private accounts as vehicles for accumulating unrestricted per-
sonal wealth rather than as an earmarked source of retirement income. 124
Bequest motives appear to be strongest among households with the high-
est levels of income and wealth, which are overwhelmingly white. Since
these households already enjoy the most favorable opportunities to accu-
mulate dynastic wealth, it seems odd-indeed, perverse-to design a
privatized social security system in a manner that would increase preex-
isting wealth disparities. Instead, if the goal of providing equal opportu-
nity for saving and capital formation is taken seriously, it may be time to
consider more direct methods to reduce racial disparities in household
wealth outside the social security system. 125
CONCLUSION
Social security provides important benefits to retired or disabled
workers and their families. The existing system, however, cannot be sus-
tained indefinitely without increasing taxes or cutting benefits. Reform
of some sort appears inevitable. Because the existing system contains
several redistributive features that work to the advantage of some groups
and to the detriment of others, any change is likely to produce both win-
ners and losers. The direction of future reform is of special concern to
black workers. Some proponents of privatization claim that black work-
ers receive especially low rates of return on their contributions under the
existing system and would fare better under a defined-contribution sys-
tem of private accounts. On closer examination, however, this claim
turns out to be potentially overstated and misleading. Some aspects of
the existing system work to the advantage of black workers as a group,
while others do not. Overall, the impact of the system appears to be
progressive, though less so than might at first appear.
At a more fundamental level, it seems inappropriate to measure the
performance of the existing system exclusively in terms of rates of return
on contributions. Social security strikes a balance between competing
goals of social adequacy and individual equity. From its inception, the
program has produced large-scale redistribution within and among gener-
ations; it was never intended to maximize rates of return for all workers
on their contributions. To argue, as some privatizers do, that the existing
system is a failure because it does not maximize private saving and capi-
124 See Peter A. Diamond, Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform, in 2
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrvrrY 1, 45 (1997) (noting political issues raised by
contrasting views of "wealth entitlement" and "retirement income entitlement").
125 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting a need for "massive redistribu-
tional policies"); Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 802-03 (urging reexamination of ra-
cially-skewed tax provisions).
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tal formation misses the point that social security has proved remarkably
successful in keeping nearly 40 percent of elderly Americans out of pov-
erty. In view of the goals of social security, a more pertinent inquiry is
whether a system of private accounts would adequately protect retired or
disabled workers and their families against the risk of lost earnings. Of
course, the answer depends largely on details of design and implementa-
tion that have yet to be fully elaborated. Nevertheless, there is good
reason for many workers, and especially black workers, to be concerned
about the implications of radical privatization. A fully privatized system
might ultimately yield higher overall returns for future workers, but it
would also expose individual workers to significant market risks and
might well exacerbate existing racial inequalities in income and wealth.
Moreover, the transition would be very costly. By comparison, the ex-
isting system may prove not to be such a bad deal after all.
